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Cooperation between two suppliers and a common retailer 
Saba Salimi 
Over past few years, supply chain coordination has been widely studied and numerous 
practitioners and researchers proposed many models on this field. Although many 
previous studies addressed channel competition considering a scenario with an exclusive 
retailer with only one producer’s brand, in real world the retailers sell various products 
with different brands. This study was to analyze the relation between two suppliers and a 
common retailer by taking various degree of product sustainability into account. The 
market is considered to be duopoly. This thesis describes modifying and implementation 
of a supply chain coordinator tool in order to enhance the profit earned by any of the 
parties involved in this supply chain. 
In this thesis we present a cooperation and collaboration model in a supply chain 
consisting of two suppliers with a common retailer. We establish the conditions for 
cooperation in such scenario with popular supply chain contracts. Even though other 
methods have been reviewed under various scenarios, we confine our interest to apply a 
coordinating contract and analyse the results. The type of the contract that can coordinate 
the supply chain is debatable and it needs to be analyzed depending on the limitations. 
The methodological approach taken in this study is modifying a contract in order to 




First we consider the classical model then the whole sale price contract is applied. Later 
in order to enable the supply chain coordination, facility sharing contract and franchise 
contract have been modified and implemented. Finally by illustrating the results of 
implementing each contract, a framework is presented. In this study the linear demand 
function is used because of tractability in providing analytical results while in real case 
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A supply chain is a system of associations, people, activities, information, and resources 
involved in transporting a product or service from a supplier to customer. Supply chain 
activities involve the transformation of raw materials and components into a finished 
product that is delivered to the end customer (Nagurney, 2006). 
Smooth functioning of this system cannot be viable without the cooperation of the supply 
chain members. Efficiency of supply chain depends upon the close coordination of key 
decision makers such as suppliers, manufacturers, retailers, etc. 
In this thesis we confine our interest to a simple supply chain with two suppliers and a 
retailer. A simplified supply chain helps us in understanding the cooperation mechanism 
among its partners in a much smoother way. We assume that the first supplier is a local 
producer and sells the product locally through a retailer. Another supplier is 
foreign/outside producer and is interested in entering in the local market. The local 
supplier produces the product with a low production cost compared to the outsider one. 
The demand of the product depends on the price; hence the outside supplier attempts to 
reduce the production cost and increase the profit. We assume that both producers 
manufacture similar products, however, production cost and reputation of the foreign 
producer (and thus retail price) are higher than the local producer. Both products are sold 
in the same market. We are interested in analyzing if the cooperation between two 
competitive producers could benefit the overall supply chain, and if yes, then what could 










We explore two models: 
1) The classical model: Figure (1-2) demonstrates the classical model that consists of 
two competitive suppliers producing similar products and the products are sold 
through a common retailer. Supplier A produces product A and supplier B produces 
product B.  
2) The partnership model: The second scenario is assuming a close partnership among 
one of the suppliers and the retailer. In this scenario we are interested in investigating 





















The incapable supplier inevitably hopes to find a way to encourage the leading supplier to 
compromise and collaborate. To make an incentive, a coordination mechanism should be 
offered that is capable to reduce the production cost and profitable for all members. 
Otherwise none of the supply members would accept the coordination strategy that may 
deteriorate their own profit. In order to coordinate the supply chain the application of 






As it is presented by Govindan et al. (2013), one of the tools to coordinate a supply chain 
is a coordinating contract that refers to comprehensive coordination mechanism used in 
both theory and practice.  
The idea of supply chain coordination theory is very extensive and it incorporates 
different aspects of the relationship between the supply chain members. A vast literature 
regarding the coordination is suggested by Arshinder et al. (2008) and it is illustrated in 
Figure (1-3). Among four coordination mechanisms illustrated in Figure (1-3), we 
confine our interest to the first mechanism which is coordination contracts and we strive 
to analyze the impact of implementing the contract on the considered supply chain.  






Joint decision making 




quality, and deadlines to improve supplier -buyer relationship. According to Arshinder et 
al. (2008) the objectives of applying a coordination contract are:  
 Maximization of the entire supply chain profit 
 Minimization of inventory related costs of overstock and shortage 
 Fair risk sharing between the parties 
Govindan et al. (2013) presented the coordinating contracts and classified them with 
respect to distinctive parameters. These contracts are applicable in forward supply chains 
or can also be modified and applied to achieve coordination in reverse supply chains 
which is not mentioned in this thesis. 
Game theory analysis plays an important role in dealing with supply chain coordination 
and it is used as an approach to coordinate and by applying the concept of game theory, 
the players are able to identify whether they are better off by cooperation or by non-
cooperative actions. 
Based on Albrecht (2010), game theory applied to the supply chain can be divided to two 
main categories:  
1) Cooperative games: The players want to coordinate while they are not 
competitors. Moreover, the supply chain members are willing to compromise. 
Thus they negotiate on a contract with defined parameters and if both parties 
comply with it, the contract is implemented. Otherwise they are considered as the 
second category. 
2) Non-cooperative players: The players are competitive and each player works 




According to Albrecht (2010), in the cooperative game the responsibility of the supply 
chain members is to decide which type of contract is applicable and modify the contract 
in such a way that both players are satisfied with the contractual terms. Not being agreed 
on the contractual terms leads to non-cooperation situation and the players will be rivals. 
As Guardiola et al., (2007) illustrated the second option for the players who do not 
comply on a contract but willing to cooperate is the coalition approach where the 
definitions of cooperative game theory are applied without a predefined procedure to be 
followed which has not been considered in this study.  
Li and Wang (2007) demonstrated the effect of cooperative actions between the players 
and indicated that: 
 Total supply chain profit is higher at cooperation than at non-cooperation; 
 The optimal order quantity of the buyer is higher at cooperation than at non-
cooperation; 
 The wholesale price of seller to buyer is lower at cooperation than at non-
cooperation. 
The aim of the project is to provide a conceptual theoretical framework based on each 
supplier’s profit function and the total supply chain’s profit and we attempt to formulate 
each supplier’s profit under different coordinating contracts.  
This thesis will be organized as follow; In order to properly explore this topic and explain 
the case; first we introduce the critical articles that cover this problem. We discuss 
important terms and topics related to the supply chain in chapters 2. Chapter 3 illustrates 




comparative numerical example in order to analyze the impact of implementing each 

















2. Literature Review 
In the areas of supply chain collaboration, the research interest can broadly be classified 
in three following streams: 
1) Channel competition and coordination 
2) Supply Chain Collaboration 
3) Supply chain coordination (coordinating contracts) 
In this chapter we provide the review under these sections; 
1.1 Channel competition and coordination  
Channel coordination has been widely studied in last two decades in marketing area. In 
general, channel competition can be classified into upstream competition and 
downstream competition. Upstream competition refers to the competition among the 
upstream partners such as suppliers, buyers and manufacturers. On the other hand, 
downstream competition addresses the competition between low level of the supply chain 
e.g. retailers and sellers. 
One of the earliest studies in the field of channel competition has been conducted by 
Jeuland and Shugan (1983). They present a frame work where the competition was 
studied in a channel with different system structure and demand. The other researches 
have conducted series of studies on this field and one of the most relevant ones to this 
thesis was contributed by Choi (1991). He stablished a model with two competing 




In 2010 Pan et al. (2010) conducted a research on a supply chain with two suppliers and 
one retailer and they showed the effect of supply chain infraction on the retailer and his 
decisions for choosing the resources. Also different power structure channel was 
considered and they defined a specific condition when it is better for the suppliers to 
work under revenue sharing contract and the same for the retailers under linear demand 
function. We can consider the mentioned paper, the closest study to this thesis. 
Ingene and Parry (1995) analyzed the downstream competition and indicated a model 
with competing retailers and they attempted to coordinate the supply chain using the 
coordinating contract. In 1997 a similar model was presented by Padmanabhan and Png 
(1997) with competing retailers and a common supplier. Recently in 2008, Yao et al. 
(2008) carried out a model with one supplier and two competing retailers and with 
stochastic demand. 
Choi (1996) analyzed both upstream and downstream competition and in his work the 
system structure was important parameter that affects the supply chain efficiency. The 
authors differentiated the Horizontal or Vertical system consequence on the supply chain 
and their main finding indicated that while (horizontal) product differentiation helps 
suppliers, it hurts retailers. Conversely, while (horizontal) store differentiation helps 
retailers, it hurts suppliers.  
The general result from numerous papers state that the manufacturers may prefer 
exclusive dealing due to reduced competition at the retailer level, even though welfare 




This thesis can be considered in the upstream competition level under deterministic 
demand that will be more explained in the following sections. 
1.2 Collaboration 
As Daugherty et al. (2006) presented, nowadays suppliers must find a way to collaborate 
with the other suppliers in the supply chain if they hope to survive, evolve and flourish. 
Decomposing old barriers and entering into such open relationships with easy exchange 
of information is not easy for many businesses. Practitioners, academics and consultants 
have stated the importance of strategic collaboration. Within a supply chain setting, 
collaboration involves two or more independent players working together to achieve 
greater success together than working independently. 
In many scenarios, collaboration of the supply chain members can help to strengthen the 
entire supply chain and all suppliers involved in the collaboration can reap greater profit 
from jointly working. Daugherty et al. (2006) stated that there are many possible 
improvements. For instance,  improved customer service, better inventory management, 
more efficient usage of resources, reduced cycle times and increased information sharing. 
Many studies have been done regarding how to implement collaborative arrangements 
and what’s required if supply chain partners want to integrate their operations and work 
together for the same goal. According to Daugherty et al. (2006), inter-organizational or 
cross-enterprise supply chain collaboration pays attention on sharing of information, joint 
development of strategic plans and synchronizing operations. But the most success is 
probable when collaborative partners integrate human, financial, and technical resources 




Daugherty et al. (2006) stated that collaboration requires that the diverse entities work 
together by sharing processes, technologies, and information to enhance the value for the 
whole group and their customers. The other factor that has an important impact on the 
collaboration is trust. Lack of trust is an important barrier to stablish a collaborative 
partnership. Collaboration without trust among the supply chain suppliers cannot be 
obtained in an easy way (Daugherty et al., 2006).  Albeit the process of trusting in a 
business is difficult, it is necessary to trust and share the information because 
collaboration is just possible when the information is divulged to collaborative partners. 
The best way to initiate trust is to first be sure that it’s not going to happen immediately. 
Thus, all members are obligated to prove through daily interactions over time as an effort 
to limit the damages caused by lack of trust. They should keep promises and strive to 
meet the expectations. Performance enhancements are expected from collaborative 
relationships and if this were not the result, suppliers would hardly take the trouble of 
working together and incur the cost of integration. Demonstrating the collaboration as an 
intriguing method is not an easy task for a supplier who is seeking to encourage another 
supplier to integrate. There are certain issues that arise in an incentive process. Daugherty 
et al. (2006) demonstrated many notable parameters that are required to be considered 
when collaboration is implemented.  
1.3  SC coordination 
Coordination theory is based on the game theoretical approach, which means that the 
success of one individual is affected by the choices made by the other participants in the 
game (Myerson, 1991). By considering this fact, Cachon (2003) studied the set of supply 




different coordination contracts. In general a system with some suppliers that are seeking 
to maximize their profit, can earn less than an integrated system. Thus it can be an 
incentive for the suppliers to comply on coordination that leads to increase the total 
profit. But obtaining a Pareto improvement is not always possible in a supply chain. As it 
is explained earlier, one of the main approaches to obtain coordination is implementing a 
coordinating contract.  
Cachon (2001) conducted a series of review on SC coordination by contracts that have 
been cited many times on stream of supply chain and he mentioned all types of 
coordinating contracts and emphasized the terms of implementation of each one on the 
channel. 
There are many types of coordinating contracts in literature but the most used ones can be 
listed as: Whole sale price (WP), Quantity discount (QD), Buy Back (BB) and Revenue 
Sharing (RS) contracts. By implementing a contract properly, supply chain members can 
enhance the efficiency of the supply chain and improve their profit and the total profit of 
the supply chain. 
What is the coordinated supply chain? According to Cachon (2003) a supply chain is 
coordinated when the set of supply chain actions is in a Nash equilibrium, i.e., none of 
the members has a profitable set of actions. In the ideal case, all the optimal actions 
should be a unique Nash equilibrium. However, there are certain drawbacks associated 
with the use of each contract. Also in most of the cases, contracts with lower complexity 
are more preferable if the contract’s efficiency is high (Cachon, 2003). The contract 
designer may prefer to suggest the simpler but high efficiency contract even though the 




refers to the ratio of the supply chain profit when the contract is implemented to the 
supply chain’s optimal profit.  
A supply chain is said to be coordinated when the total expected profit is improved after 
the contract is implemented. Also a Pareto efficient contract is a situation when all the 
members are no worse off with the existing contract than any other contracts. Thereby the 
so-called win-win condition is considered. SC contracts are a useful tool to make the 
members behave coherently and improve the channel performance (Giannoccaro, 2004). 
Moreover these contracts have an important role on the risk which is taken by any SC 
members. In the other words, the risk is shared among the members (Tsay, 1999). 
Particularly in our case under each contract that we considered, the risk is taken by the 
retailer or the supplier based on the terms of the contract. 
An important review that investigates the relationships within the SC has been carried out 
by Tsay et al. (1991) and they considered abundant topics in contractual scheme. 
Contract implementation 
Cachon (2003) proposed the sequence of the decision process for implementing a 
contract; In this sequence, the first step is to identify the potential motivation in the 
supply chain and define a contract that can be applicable and improve the entire supply 
chain profit although the terms of the contract would be changed with respect to the each 
member’s characteristics. The set of parameters for the contract are defined. 
Furthermore for each type of coordinating contract, the possible range of profit 
allocations is evaluated and finally the contract implementation and the impact on the 




For simplifying the evaluation process of choosing the type of contract which is efficient 
to be implemented, Cachon (2003) suggested the following assessment criteria for 
contract implementation: 
- Supply chain coordination, indicates that after implementing the coordinating contract, 
none of the supply chain members should have the incentive to deviate from the supply 
chain actions.  
- Administrative costs, indicating that administrative cost that is concluded from the 
explained details in the contract definitions, is an important criteria for an efficient 
contract. 
- Risk and benefits sharing are considered as an important feature of any contract that 
should be allocated in a fair way. Moreover, the fair division of the total profit of supply 
chain affects the performance of the contract. 
Administrative cost plays an important rule when the coordinating contract is 
implemented and evaluated. The main achievement is minimizing the cost, however the 
administrative cost cannot be omitted and it is directly related to the type of the 
coordinating contract that embraces the transactions (Govindan et al., 2013). 
According to Govindan et al. (2013), the simpler contracts force the supply chain 
members to confront with less administrative cost in compare to the more complicated 
contracts.  
For instance, wholesale price contracts and quantity discount contracts are costly in 
analogous way, while revenue sharing, buyback and quantity flexibility contracts imply a 
higher cost which is concluded from the higher level of detail and additional required 




Govindan et al. (2013) explained that there are a set of parameters taken into 
consideration when designing a model of coordination by contracts for instance: supply 
chain structure, the incentive/coordination part, the theory applied in analyzing the 
model, the type of demand approach, and the time horizon. The coordinating contracts 
can be designed to improve the condition of the supply chain members in the cases of 
two-echelon supply chains (with the number of participants n   and with n  = 2) and 
multi-echelon supply chains (with n  3). This thesis in considered in a multi-echelon 
supply chain due to three participants in the supply chain. 
Each contract is studied in two different scenarios: when the demand is deterministic and 
when the demand is considered as a stochastic parameter. It is obvious that this difference 
for the demand has an important effect on all the supply chain members and the strategy 
they choose to have for the production. It affects all the parameters related to production, 
for instance: lead time, safety stock etc. 
Demand 
In this study we discuss a particular supply chain under deterministic demand and we 
assume that the manufacturer's demand is known at the time of the order, meaning that 
the demand forecast at the start of production process is the actual demand during every 
order. During the on-order time, demand for the manufacturer is said not to be changed. 
All parties know the demand and it is not considered as private information.  Ignoring 
this assumption forces the manufacturer into greater uncertain. 
However, in a realistic scenario demand is never constant and known at the time of 




(2000) explained that demand uncertainty strengthens the incentive conflicts 
between two parties, as in general they will have opposing objectives. When the 
manufacturer is not certain about the demand, he should use some tools to predict the 
demand and order based on this information. Forecasting is used to predict demand, and 
as time approaches the forecasted date, demand can be better approximated.  
In order to explore this situation we make the following assumptions about demand; 
(1) We assume that demand is known by both parties.   
(2)  We assume that all possible demands can be met by regular production.   
(3) We assume no possibility of buy-back contracts. Once the supplier delivers the 
order to the retailer, products may not be bought back by the supplier at a 
negotiated cost.  
It is important to mention that implementation of a contract model needs a high degree of 
cooperation among all the SC members during the designing phase. However, there is no 
contrast with decentralized decision-making where the SC members need to know each 
other concerns about their unit price. Furthermore, the desirability of the contractual 
scheme by the various chain members plays an important role. This deals with adjusting 
the contract parameters so as to make all decisions well accepted by the players.  
In each supply chain there are multiple actions that should be done, and usually they are 
not in the best interest of the supply chain members because they are concerning about 
maximizing their own profit. And mostly this concern conducts to the poor performance. 
However, the supply chain can be coordinated by setting some relations and fixed 




The supplier that wants to offer a contract should consider the most favorable contract 
which the other supplier will accept. Moreover suppliers are likely to offer many supply 
chain scenarios to entice the rest and finally all the supply chain members will agree on 
the most profitable one. The one they stipulate, they set the details and rules.  
Another definition in supply chain refers the type of profit that is earned by the retailers 
or manufacturers. Reservation profit is the profit that the members of the supply chain 
will gain and for implementing new action if the profit is below the reservation profit, 
they will not participate in the supply chain (Cachon, 2003). 
Incremental profit is the difference between the supply chain’s maximum profit and the 
reservation profit. This type of profit is a useful measure because among all the possible 
contracts, this upper bound can be helpful to decide if a contract is beneficial for any of 
the members or not (Cachon et al., 2010). 
 Whole Sale Price (WP) 1.3.1
Whole sale price (WP) is the classic contract that has been widely used in the supply 
chain coordination filed. Under this classic model, all the risk of overage of the products 
is accrued by the retailer and the supplier is not facing any compensation for the unsold 
units. On stream of wholesale price research, this contract has been studied under 
stochastic and deterministic demand. In 1988 Shugan and Jeuland (1988) studied WP 
under deterministic demand. Then it was contributed by (Choi, 1991 and 1996).  Petruzzi 
and Dada (1999) studied WP with considering stochastic demand. In 1999 Lariviere 
(1999) indicated that whole sale price cannot coordinate the supply chain. Recently Pan 




More related research to this thesis have been done by Trivedi (1998), Lee and Staelin 
(1997) and Albeniz and Roels (2007) who studied channels consist of multiple 
manufacturers and a common retailer by considering wholesale price contract.   
In this thesis WP is used as a criterion for analyzing the efficiency of the other supply 
chain contract and for comparative result. 
 Revenue Sharing contract (RS) 1.3.2
Supply chain coordination with revenue sharing contract has been well studied (see 
Cachon (2003) and references therein). In RS contract, the supplier or manufacturer 
charges the retailer W  per unit purchased plus the retailer gives the 
supplier/manufacturer a certain percentage of his revenue from that unit. Because all the 
revenue is shared, the salvage revenue can also be shared, however in this thesis only the 
regular revenue is shared. If f is the retailer's share of revenue generated from each unit 
then (1 - f) is the fraction of the revenue that the supplier earns. RS contracts have been 
applied successfully in the video cassette rental industry (2002). The introduction of 
revenue sharing coincided with a significant improvement in performance at Blockbuster: 
Warren and Peers (2002) report that Blockbuster’s market share of video rentals 
increased from 24% in 1997 to 40% in 2002. Not surprisingly, this has led to litigation 
against Blockbuster and the movie studios, alleging that revenue-sharing contracts have 
hurt competition in the industry (Wall Street Journal 2002). Indeed, evidence shows that 
the new terms of trade helped the industry in aggregate: Mortimer (2000) estimates 




As well as other contracts, RS is studied by Giannoccaro and Pontrandolfo in 2004 under 
deterministic demand and under stochastic demand (Wang et al., 2004; Cachon and 
Lariviere, 2005; Yao et al., 2008; Qin and Yang, 2008). Despite its numerous merits 
Cachon and Lariviere (2005) identify several limitations of revenue sharing to (at least 
partially) explain why it is not prevalent in all industries. In particular, it is characterized 
cases in which revenue sharing provides only a small improvement over the 
administratively cheaper wholesale price contract. Additionally, revenue sharing does not 
coordinate a supply chain with demand that depends on costly retail effort. In 2004, 
Giannoccaro et al., published a paper in which they worked on RS which is used in 
coordinating a decentralized three stage SC. They trace stochastic demand and devoted a 
major attention to the fine tuning of contracts parameters in order to obtain the win-win 
condition.   
 In 2005, Pasternack demonstrated that RS is an attractive way to achieve channel 
coordination but if the manufacturer wants to stay to the current pricing structure for the 
products while RS is implemented, there is a possibility that without the side payment 
form the vendor, the manufacturer’s expected profit would decrease (Pasternack, 2005). 
Bernstein and Federgruen (2005) show that, a nonlinear version of the price-discount 
contract does coordinate this setting. A second limitation of revenue sharing, which is 
probably more significant than the first, is the administrative burden it imposes on the 
suppliers. Under revenue sharing, the supplier must monitor the retailer’s revenues to 
verify that they split appropriately. The gains from coordination may not always cover 
these costs. To explore this idea, Cachon and Lariviere (2005) studied the performance of 




administrative cost than revenue sharing. They demonstrate that there is considerable 
variation in supply chain performance under a wholesale price contract and conclude that 
revenue sharing’s administrative burden may explain why it is not implemented in some 
settings.  
Cachon and Lariviere (2005) suggest that revenue-sharing contracts are very effective in 
a wide range of supply chains. They analyzed revenue sharing in downstream 
competition and it has been proved that revenue sharing can coordinate the supply chain 
with competitive retailers in terms of sales volume better than the other contracts. They 
indicated that revenue sharing generally does not coordinate competing retailers when 
each retailer’s revenue depends on its quantity, its price, and the actions of the other 
retailers, e.g., competing price-setting newsvendors with each retailer’s demand 
depending on the vector of retail prices. For this setting, more complex contracts are 
needed, e.g., additional parameters or nonlinear components. 
Finally, revenue sharing does not coordinate a supply chain when non contractible and 
costly retailer effort influences demand. Nevertheless, Cachon and Lariviere (2005)   
show that the supplier may still choose to implement revenue sharing if the impact of 
effort is sufficiently small. 
 Franchise contract (FC) 1.3.3
The franchise contract was first applied in USA at the end of the nineteenth century. 
According to Velentzas et al. (2013), this contract has been carried out as a marketing 




alternative to build chain store for the franchisor to distribute goods that avoids the 
investment.  
As noted by Agallopoulou (2010), franchise contract can be divided into four main 
groups and the particular type of this contract that can be applied on this study is 
production or industrial franchising. This type of contract refers to yielding the license to 
manufacture or alter certain products with respect to the main instructions and sell them 
with the franchisor’s trade brand. 
 Summary  1.3.4
To sum up the literature, the most relative studies to this thesis can be summarized as 
follow: 
1. Choi (1991) investigated a channel of two competing manufacturers and a 
common retailer under different power structure scenarios. Authors stablished the 
model under linear and nonlinear demand functions and the results were reverse 
under these two types of demand (Choi, 1991). 
2.   Cachon and Kök (2010) studied competing manufacturers who sell their product 
through a single retailer. Authors implemented WP, quantity discount and two-
part tariffs and the results of applying these three coordinating contracts have 
been compared based on product substitutability and other parameters (Cachon et 
al., 2010).  
3. Pan et al., (2010) presented that considered a supply chain consists of two 




price versus revenue sharing contract under different channel power structures 
and the preference of the players under specific condition (Pa et al., 2010). 
 








Power structure Channel type Main finding 
Choi 
(1991) 











supplier and a 
common 
retailer 
Under linear demand 
function: price and profit 
increase as products are 
less differentiated, better 
off for manufacturer with 
exclusive dealer and 
opposite for the retailer. 
Reverse result under non-
linear demand function. 
Better off for all members 
when no one dominants 
the supply chain. 
Choi 
(1996) 












While (horizontal) product 
differentiation helps 
manufacturers, it hurts 
retailers. Conversely, 
while (horizontal) store 
differentiation helps 

















FS can coordinate a 
supply chain with single 
supplier and retailer. Also 
it can coordinate a supply 
chain with competing 
retailers. They compare 






















Quantity discount and  
two-part tariff force 
manufacturer to compete 
more aggressively. 
 























In a two manufacturers– 
one retailer channel it is 
beneficial for either one or 
both manufacturers to use 
a RS contract under the 
manufacturer-dominated 
scenario. While in a 
manufacture–two retailers 
channel, it is beneficial for 
either one or both retailers 













_ Two competing 
suppliers 





According to the mentioned literature, the contribution of this thesis is using modified 
revenue sharing and franchise contract in order to be applicable to a specific scenario. 
The modified revenue sharing and franchise contract with deterministic demand have not 
been presented before. In addition, we mention the partnership of retailer and a supplier 
























3. Formulation of the supply chain 
1.4 Introduction 
We confine our interest to investigate the coordination mechanism of two competing 
suppliers and see if a contract can be helpful in realizing such coordination. We first 
study the classical model with two competing suppliers and a common retailer and then 
design a contract to investigate the coordination mechanism. For analytical simplicity we 
use deterministic demand function and thus shortage and left over of stock is not 
applicable to our models. Each supplier is assumed to produce only one product and a 
common retailer is the only channel to sell those products.   We consider two scenarios – 
in the first scenario, we assume all the three members of the supply chain are 
independent. The first setting is a classical setting and several researchers investigated the 
coordination mechanism in similar settings. In the second scenario, our main research 
topic, we consider the first supplier is part of the retailer and second supplier wants to sell 
the product through this retailer.  
Choi (1991) stated that all parties will be better off when no one dominates the market 
and none of the members has a leading role in the supply chain. The whole industry as 
well as the customers is better off when none of the channel members are in dominant 
position. According to above paper, the total profit of the system when there is no leader 
is more than a channel with stackelberg leader because the selling prices are lower and 





1.5 Two suppliers through a common retailer 
This model has been first studied by Choi (1991).  The author considered two 
competitive producers with a common retailer and demonstrated that depending on the 
demand function, the results for coordination would be different for each party in various 
scenarios. The author discussed various channel structures under linear and non-linear 
demand functions. According to the above research, under linear demand function the 
supplier is better off by dealing with exclusive retailer while the retailer is willing to deal 
with several producers. The results are different under the non-linear demand function. 
The importance of choosing the correct demand function is indicated in the papers 
referring the channel coordination. 
In this chapter, first we discuss a scenario where two competitive suppliers produce their 
products with varying degree of substitutability. The final product is shipped from each 
supplier to the retailer. We first present a wholesale price contract in which each supplier 
sells the product to the retailer at a given wholesale price and then retailer set the retail 
price for each product. 
For ease of exposition, we name product A and product B produced by supplier A and 
supplier B, respectively. Also we assume all the information related to the suppliers and 
retailer is available to all parties. We do not distinguish between these two suppliers from 
the aspect of being competitive because we assume both brands are well known. 
Each supplier is expected to seek higher profit and get the better pay off by considering 
the market and minimizing the production cost. The optimum selling price can be 




production cost is fixed, by using the related expression, both suppliers can moderate 
their whole sale price and optimize their revenue albeit there are many other parameters 
that influence the profit which are not our object of study here. 
                                             
                                                                                                                                                                                               
                                             
                                             
Figure (3-1) demonstrates the primary model that we consider which consists of two 
suppliers, a retailer and the market. The suppliers are producing products A and B and the 
retailer releases the products in the market.  
As it was mentioned before, in order to simplify the model, we assume the following 
conditions: 
1. Unlimited capacity for each supplier 
2. Duopoly market  
Primary Model 
In order to formulate the model, we first describe the demand function and then the profit 
function. Choosing the best demand function plays an important role in channel 
coordination and there is a noticeable difference in supply chain efficiency when linear 
demand function is used or non-linear demand function is considered (Choi, 1991). For 

















Although many practitioners have applied the stochastic demand function, to make the 
model easier we consider deterministic demand for both products. Thus salvage value 
and shortage costs have not been considered in this thesis. 
 To model the classical problem, we use the following notations: 
: index for the manufacturers ,
: Production cost
: Market size of the th manufacturer
: th supplier's sensitivity
: th supplier's competitor's sensitivity



















Profit of the th manufacturer








The decision variables are: 
: Retailpriceof the th product






We use the following duopoly static demand function that captures the product 
differentiations and each product’s selling price: 
( , ) for and  i i j i i i i jD P P P P i A j B                         (1)        
The parameter i  represents the initial market share of the thi  product. i  shows the 
own-price sensitivity of each supplier and this parameter is directly related to the 
popularity of the product. In other words, when the product is very well-known and 
popular between the customers, this parameter is small because when the selling price 
increases, still there is high demand for the product and the increment in selling price 




To show the impact of the competitor’s price, 
i  is defined and each dollar increasing in 
the competitor’s selling price, leads to more demand for other product. Also product 
substitutability is characterized by 
i  and with higher values of i , the product 
substitutability is higher ; so the products are closer and can be easily substituted. Hence 
this parameter has an immense effect on demand. Also these parameters are assumed to 
satisfy 0i i     according to Jeuland and Shugan (1988). In the experimental section, 
these two parameters are set to be between zero and one. When i i    decreases and i  
approaches i , the products are more substitutable and less differentiated, hence there is 
more potential price competition between the suppliers (Choi, 1991). However, in our 
model beside the product differentiation, we use this parameter to show the reaction of 
the supplier to his competitor’s selling price. 
We assume that the above demand model is symmetric and this indicates a case where 
both players have equal competing power in a duopolistic market place (Yao et al., 
2008). 
Figure (3-2) indicates the results obtained from the profit function based on linear   
demand function. As it can be seen from this plot, the profit function is concave; thus we 






Figure ‎0-2 Concavity of profit function [adopted from Choi, 1991] 
 
Weakness of the demand function  
Albeit the mentioned demand function indicates the market share and effect of selling 
prices in an appropriate way, there are some limitations using this function in some 
special scenarios. Imagine the first selling price is too high, even higher than the average 
selling price, and the second selling price is also very high. It is logical that when the 
selling price is much more than the normal price, there will not be any customer who is 
willing to buy the product even if the product is a very well-known brand. However 
dealing with this demand function, there is still demand for this product that is not 
rational.  
Moreover, although this linear demand function has been widely used in the literature, 




difference between and    is very small, the products are less differentiated and when 
i i   is near zero, the products are nearly perfect substitutes. The demand function is 
rewritten as: 
( , ) ( ) for and  i i j i i i jD P P P P i A j B                              (2)        
If the selling prices are equal, then the demand function would be independent of the 
selling prices and the market share is exclusively the only affective parameter on demand. 
This is not logically feasible since the vendors would be able to choose infinite selling 
prices and still have demand. As a result, the profit for all the parties increases when the 
products are less differentiated regardless of the channel structure. And it is logical for 
the supplier to prefer an exclusive retailer rather than a common one with other suppliers 
when the products are so similar (Choi, 1991). 
These are some limitations of using the linear demand function; however we adopted it 
for ease of use and better insights. The following part interprets the profit earned by each 
supply chain member at the end of the season. 
 Case 1: No Retailer, two suppliers (Hypothetical case) 1.5.1
In this hypothetical case, we assume that there is no retailer and only two suppliers sell 
their products directly to the market, then whole sale price will not exist and suppliers 
have all the information of the customers and they can sell their product directly through 
other ways such as selling through online websites. However this case is hypothetical and 









Profit of the suppliers 
Profit of each supplier without the existence of the retailer can be defined as: 
( , ) for and 
( , ) ( )( ) for and 
i i j i i i i
i i j i i i i j i i
F P P D P DC i A j B
F P P P P P C i A j B  
   
     
              (3) 
And the total profit is given by:  
Total profit= ( , ) ( , ) for and i i j j i jF P P F P P i A j B                      (4)                                      
The above profit function indicates the total profit of each supplier depends upon the 
demand, selling price and the production cost. Due to the concavity of the profit function, 
equating the first order derivative to zero yields the optimal sales price: 
( , )
2 for and 
i i j
i i i i j i i
i
F P P
P P C i A j B
P
   

     

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i j i j
C C
P i A j B
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            (6)                                            














* * *( , ) ( ) for and i i j i i i i jD P P P P i A j B                   (7)                                  
From (6) it can be easily deduced that for a price to be valid the following should hold:  
4 0 for and i j i j i A j B                   (8)                                                          
The above inequality implies the relation between own-price sensitivity and the 




    for these two parameters which demonstrates that the value of own-
price sensitivity should be more than half of the competitor’s price sensitivity.    
In the next section we discuss the case consists of two suppliers and a common retailer. 
 Case 2: Competing suppliers selling through a common Retailer (CSAR)  1.5.2
In this model we assume that each supplier sells its products to end consumer through a 
common retailer. For clarity of expression, we use ‘He’ to represent the first supplier and 
‘She’ to represent the second supplier. We first analyze the relationship using the 
classical wholesale price contract. Figure (3-4) illustrates a system consists of two 
suppliers selling product A and B to the retailer at a wholesale price iW  per unit. Then the 















Profit function for the retailer based on the whole sale price and linear demand function is 
given by: 
( , ) ( )( ) ( )( ) For  and R i j i i i i j i i j j j j i j jF P P P P P W P P P W i A j B                (9) 
As discussed before, salvage or shortage are not considered due to deterministic demand. 
Total profit function of the retailer is literally the retailer’s reaction function to the 
supplier’s whole sale price. Total profit and the optimal selling prices can be derived 
from the first order conditions of (9): 
( , )
2R A B A A A A B A A B B B B
A
dF P P
P P W P W
dP
                                                                                            















2R A B B B B B A B B A A A A
B
dF P P
P P W P W
dP
                                                     (10)                              
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                                                                (11) 
By considering the condition we set for  and    (i.e. 0   ), the determinative of the 
second order derivatives of equation (9) is negative. Therefore we can obtain the 
maximum of the profit function. 
Equally competitive suppliers                                                            
The main objective is to achieve the optimum selling price that can maximize the total 
profit of the supply chain. However, to do the primary calculations, it is presumed that 
the own-price sensitivity parameter and the competitor’s price sensitivity parameter are 
equal for both suppliers. In other words, the suppliers are equally competitive and have 
same market share ( , )A B A B     . 
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After equating (12) to zero, on further reduction, we obtained the expressions for the 
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According to equation (13), the optimal selling price that is the reaction of the retailer to 
the whole sale price, when A B   and A B   can be shown as:   










                 (14) 
We can see that the selling price is directly related to the whole sale price. It should be 
noted that the above selling price can be used only for the particular scenario where the 
suppliers are equally competitive and equally own price sensitive ( A B  and A B  ). 
Supplier’s optimal profit 
By using equation (14), the optimal profit of each supplier can be calculated based on the 
selling price. As indicated earlier, profit is the total revenue that the supplier obtains 
subtracted from the total production cost: 
* * *( , ) ( )( ) For  and i i j i i i iF P P W C P P i A j B              (15)               
As indicated above, the optimal supplier’s profit is obtained based on the whole sale price 
and the production cost. If we can substitute *iP  in the profit function (15), the profit 
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      
  
                         (16) 
For  and i A j B   







                                                                                                                (17) 







 ) is applicable only for this 
scenario. They are equally competitive, equal price sensitivity and have the same market 
share. The profit function for the thi  supplier due to the above substitution will be 
changed to: 
*( , ) ( ) For  and 
2 2
ji
i i j i i
WW
F W W W C A A i A j B    
 
        
 
           (18) 
Thus expression (18) states the profit function based on the whole sale price and the 
selling price is not used in the mentioned function.  
Whole sale price, retail price and production cost 
If we want to determine the supplier’s whole sale price, it is possible to consider the first 
order derived function of supplier’s profit with respect to the whole sale price (Choi, 
1991). 
*( , )
For  and 
2 2
i i j j
i i
i
F W W W
W C A A i A j B
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
       
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Substituting A  in equation (19) allows us to obtain the whole sale price for product A 
and B:  









            (20)                                  
The function above illustrate that in order to obtain positive profit, the whole sale price 
should be higher than half of production cost. Otherwise the profit of the supplier will be 
negative that is not a feasible solution for the equation. 
By using function (19), it is possible to investigate the relation between the whole sale 
price and the production cost: 
We can consider the common parts and simplify the equations:
2 2
2 2
Because the left side is common, we can make the right side equal:
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The subtracted wholesale price and production cost can be written as:  
( ) ( )
2





                                                                               (21) 
The above expression indicates the relation between the whole sale price and the 
production cost and it is obvious that although the other parameters have an impact on the 




this equation   and   for supplier A and supplier B are equal. It means that we consider 
both suppliers equally competitive in this particular case. 
Exclusive profit function  
We can rewrite the profit function for supplier A in another way based on the wholesale 
price: 
( , ) ( )
2 2
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By using the last part of above equations, the profit function is adjusted to a simpler 
function: 
( , ) ( )
2 2
A
A A B A A A A
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 * 2( ) ( )   
2
A A A AF W W C

                                                                                                 (22) 
The same for the second supplier: 
* 2( ) ( )                    
2
B B B BF W W C





Expression (23) indicates that under wholesale price contract the profit can be obtained 
when the wholesale price and production cost are accessible for both parties.  




 derivative of the profit functions of the 
suppliers are both negative hence the supplier’s profit function is concave and there is a 
unique solution that maximizes the profit. 
Retail price and wholesale by considering the parameters 
Solving (22) and (23), whole sale price is given by: 
(2 )
For  and 




W i A j B
  
     

   
  
  (24)                                        
The above function indicates that the whole sale price of the supplier is positively related 
to the production cost of both products A and B (Choi, 1996). 
Replacing the whole sale price in the functions (14) provides the retail price: 
(2 )(3 2 )
For  and 
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   
   (25)   
If we consider the same production cost for each supplier, the problem becomes 
symmetric and it is easier to analyze ( )A BC C C  . The whole sale price and selling 
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         (27) 
By considering 0i i    , the above prices are always positive so by assigning the 
mentioned selling price, positive profit will be obtained (Choi, 1996). 
Different characteristics 
In this part we investigate another scenario where the characteristics of each supplier are 
unique and they have various feature. In contrast to the last part that the suppliers were 
considered equally competitive, equally sensitive to own price and had equal market 
share, here all the parameters are different for each supplier.  As we obtained the selling 
price for the first case, it allows us to indicate the optimum selling price given by the 
derived equations (9) and (10). The derived function will provide us the optimal selling 
prices for both suppliers: 
*
2
( )( ) 2 ( )
For  and 
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i j j j j i i j i i i j j
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i j i j
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P i A j B
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     
  
 
   (28)  
And for the supplier B is given by: 
*
2
( )( ) 2 ( )
For  and 
4 ( )
i j i i i j j i j j j i i
j
i j i j
W W W W
P i A j B
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     
  
 
   (29)    
The optimal selling price function is feasible if the condition  24 ( )i j i j      is satisfied. 
The mentioned condition is satisfied if i i   and j j   (Jeuland and Shugan, 1988). 
The condition stipulates that the demand of each product is more sensitive to his own-




B as well. It is noticeable to mention that when 0i i    and this difference decreases, 
it means that the price sensitivity is getting closer to the competitor’s price sensitivity. In 
other word when i  is increasing, two products can be substituted easily by the 
customers and it leads to more competition in selling prices. Each dollar increase in the 
selling price of the competitor’s product, highly affects the demand of the other product. 
In order to show the effect of each parameter on the selling price, a numerical example 
has been used and the graphs are shown in Appendix A1. To sum up, the main 
parameters have the following impact: 
1) Effect of   (product substitutability): The figures show the positive effect of 
product similarity on selling prices of product A and B that leads to more 
competition. These differences can be explained in part by the proximity of 
  and  . When   is fixed, the profit of supplier A and supplier B is 
increasing by augmentation of  . (See Appendix A1.1) 
2)  Effect of  (own price sensitivity): The overview of effecting price 
sensitivity on the selling and wholesale price proves that when the market is 
so accurate about the product’s selling price, each dollar increasing has a huge 
impact on the demand. When  increases the profit of supplier A and supplier 
B decrease.  (See Appendix A1.1) 
 Partnership of supplier A and the retailer (CR&S) 1.5.3
Prior to commencing this section, it is notable that although close partnership is always 




second scenario a partnership case while the goal is to determine whether partnership can 
coordinate the supply chain and make better profit or not. 
In real world there are numerous famous retailers that collaborate with an exclusive 
brand. That means they sell one specific brand at the store, also they play as the retailer 
for the other brands even though the products could be the same. The following list is 
some examples of some famous retailers who have their own exclusive brand and also 
sell the other brands: 
 Canadian tire: Canadian tire is a big retailer that sells the products under the brand 
“Master Craft” which is specifically produced for Canadian tire and also many 
other products with different brands are provided in the store. 
 Pharmaprix: Shoppers (Pharmaprix) is Canada’s largest retail pharmacy chain and 
it uses the brand “Life” that is only sold at the Shoppers and many other brands of 
food, cosmetics etc. are sold at this retailer. 
 Some other examples of great retailers: Costco, Maxie & Cie, IGA, Jean Coutu 
etc. 
In all the mentioned retailers, the specific brand is just available at the designated retailer 
exclusively and not at the other retailers. For instance Kirkland product (which is 
produced exclusively for Costco) cannot be found at another retailer. 
We try to investigate the impact of partnership on our basic model and for the purpose of 
analysis, supplier A has an alliance with the retailer and they work together for the shared 




Hence we assume that supplier A and the retailer agree on partnership and they can be 
stated as very close partners. Notice that the whole sale price contract is still implemented 
and all of the terms are arbitrarily applied. This assumption is conducted into a situation 
where coordination exists between supplier A and the retailer and relatively they can be 
considered as one element in the supply chain. However, when supplier A and the retailer 
work as one component, it would be an obvious observation that in particular, the 
analysis of the above scenario concludes to an incentive for supplier B to be involved by 
reason of obtaining more profit. The coordination between the retailer and supplier A 






Since supplier A and the retailer are close partners, the whole sale price for product A 
does not exist any longer and it is replaced by AC  which is the production cost. Albeit the 
















According to the explanation under wholesale price contract, the retailer earns his own 
profit which is the profit of selling product A (that is produced by supplier A). In 
addition, he receives the profit from selling product B in this particular scenario. The 
wholesale price of the product A is replaced by the production cost. Thus, the profit 
function under deterministic linear demand function is given by: 
( , ) ( )( ) ( )( )     R A B A A A A A A B B B B B B B AF P P P C P P P W P P                                         (30)                             
Regarding to function (30), the first part refers to the profit out of selling product A and 
the second part belongs to the other supplier’s product (product B). By considering the 
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The profit function (31) indicates that the profit of the retailer can be obtained 
independently from the selling price if all the variables are known. As it was explained 
earlier, the whole sale price of product A is not used and is replaced by the production 






Supplier B’s profit 
The profit function for supplier B does not change and it is considered the same profit 
function as no-partnership scenario that is given by: 
( , ) ( )( )B A B B B B B B B AF P P W C P P                                                                          (32)       
Supplier B produces product B and she incurs the production cost, then it is sold to the 
retailer by $ BW  per unit. By taking equally competitive and equally sensitive to the price 
into account, the changes will follow the same as the last section and the only difference 
is the replacement of the whole sale price of product A with the production cost since the 







 , the profit 
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                                                               (33) 
Function (33) allows us to obtain the profit function when the wholesale price and 
production cost are provided. 
Optimal selling price 
In order to obtain the optimal selling price for products A and B, the first order derived 
function of retailer’s profit is used. The selling price is set by the retailer and it is yield to 
all the supply chain members.  The optimal selling price for product A is given by:
*
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( )( ) 2 ( )
4 ( )
A B B B B A A B A A A B B
A
A B A B
W C C W
P
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The same calculation has been done for product B and the selling price is interpreted as: 
*
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( )( ) 2 ( )
4 ( )
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B
A B A B
C W W C
P
        
   
     

 
                                       (35) 
Equations (34) and (35) show the optimal selling prices of each product and again the 
condition of 24 ( )A B A B      should be held to obtain positive selling price. The 
mentioned condition is satisfied if A A   and B B   (Jeuland and Shugan, 1988). 
The effect of the main parameters on the profit based on our numerical example in 
chapter 4 is categorized as follow: 
1) Impact of   (competitor’s price sensitivity): increasing the competitor’s price 
sensitivity is positively affecting the selling prices of product A and B. However, 
partnership conducts into lower selling price for supplier A. The profit of supplier A and 
supplier B are increasing by increasing  . However it can be seen that supplier B is 
better off when there is no partnership of supplier A and retailer (Appendix A1.2). 
2) Impact of    (own price sensitivity): Increase in own price sensitivity has negative 
effect on demand and profit, respectively (Appendix A1.2). 
The above parts belong to the implementation of the wholesale price contract on the 
system with partnership. Next part investigates if applying other contracts can coordinate 
the supply chain or not. First we study facility sharing contract inspired by revenue 
sharing. Next, a modified franchise contract is discussed. 
First set of analysis has been done on partnership and non-partnership of supplier A and 




beneficial. Therefore we apply the facility sharing contract on the partnership of supplier 
A and retailer scenario (CR&S). 
 Offering a new coordinating contract 1.5.4
In the context of supply chain coordination, as it was mentioned earlier, each player seeks 
to maximize his own profit and this approach can be achieved by coordination through a 
contract. In this specific case, we assume that product B is a famous brand. However, the 
production cost is higher compared to producing A by supplier A. Supplier A is the 
prevailing member and he is not willing to change his approach unless the profit 
enhances. 
In the following section we confine our interest to modify and apply two very similar 
contracts with an inconsiderable difference. The first contract that is offered to be 
replaced by the whole sale price contract is a facility sharing contract inspired by revenue 
sharing contract in supply chains.  
1.5.4.1 Facility sharing contract (FS) 
Consider supplier A is able to produce with lower production cost in contrast to supplier 
B. By assuming that supplier A has unlimited production capacity, we can define a 
facility sharing contract as follows; Supplier A will produce his own product (A) and 
produces his competitor’s product (B). Since supplier A is privileged with lower 
production cost, product B can be produced by supplier A with lower price. 
The transaction consists of a payment from supplier B to supplier A for producing 




supplier A and supplier B pays FSS  dollar for each unit of B produced by supplier A
( )FS AS C . 
So Supplier A agrees on producing his competitor’s product with the same production 
cost of A. But in return, supplier A is given a fraction ( ) of the revenue from selling 
product B. It is notable that supplier B is the one who is in charge for making decision 
about the order quantity and she is the player who occur the lost and also takes the risk. 
Supplier B claims the order size and supplier A produces and sells product B through the 
retailer. Both products are being sold through the same retailer in a mutual market. The 
low price for FSS  is a type of deduction and discount that is given to supplier B by 
supplier A in return of fractional revenue. The figure below indicates the contract 
implementation on the supply chain: 
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To model the problem, we define the following extra notations: 
: Shared fraction of the revenue
: Profit of supplier after Facility sharing contract
: Profit of the Retailer after Facility sharing contract














Linear demand function is considered similar to previous sections:  
( , ) for and  i i j i i i i jD P P P P i A j B         
We consider the revenue from selling product B is shared exclusively and salvage value 
does not exist.  
The explicit definition is provided by analyzing the profit function for each supplier with 
respect to the terms of facility sharing contract.  
Supplier A’s profit function 
As it was mentioned before we consider supplier A and the retailer as very close partners. 
Hence we consider a combined profit for them: 
FS
AF = own  profit (product A) – production cost of B + payment received from Supplier 
B for product B + fraction of the revenue of selling product B 
By using the previously mentioned notations, the profit function is given by: 
   
   
( , ) ( )
*
FS
A A B A A A A A A B A B B B B A
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B B B B A B B B B B A
F P P P C P P C P P
S P P P P P
     
      
      
     
                 (36) 
Supplier B’s profit function 




( , )FSB A BF P P =   purchasing cost from supplier A+ revenue from product B- fraction of 
the revenue shared with supplier A  
By using the previously mentioned notations, the profit function is given by: 
   ( , ) (1 )FS FSB A B B B B B A B B B B B AF P P S P P P P P                                      (37) 
Optimal selling prices 
Each supply chain member seeks to enhance the profit and due to the concavity of profit 
function we are able to obtain the optimal selling prices. The first order derived function 
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                                      (38) 
Equating (38) to zero provides the optimal selling prices: 
*
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       (39) 
And the selling price of product B can be obtained by: 
*
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( ( ) )( ) 2 ( )
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         (40) 
Comparing the above optimal selling prices with the selling prices under WP contract, the 




price is positive if the condition of 24 ( )A B A B       is hold, otherwise the selling 
price is not a feasible solution for this problem.  
In chapter 4, we applied the facility sharing contract on a designated numerical example. 
We also compared the profit of each member under wholesale price contract and facility 
sharing contract under various scenarios. The results show a significant augmentation in 
supplier B’s profit since the production cost is highly reduced after implementing revenue 
sharing contract.   
Next section contributes to a modified franchise contract. New parameters are used and 
the effect of each parameter is discussed.  
1.5.4.2 Modified Franchise (FC) 
The second suggested contract that can contribute the supply chain coordination is 
defined based on franchise contract. In this contract, there is a franchisee and a franchisor 
who agree on particular obligations. 
This type of contract refers to yielding the license to manufacture or alter certain products 
with respect to the main instructions and sell them with the franchisor’s trade brand. To 
enable the franchise contract for our case, we modified and changed it in some terms. The 
modified franchise contract is so close to facility sharing and there is only a small 
difference that will be explained in following sections. 
The retailer is willing to pay a lower whole sale price for product B and supplier B wants 
to reduce her production cost. Since product B is also a good brand, we assume that 




produces products with brand of B. Supplier A obtains the permission to use the 
competitor’s (Supplier B’s) brand and in return, supplier A will pay supplier B a fixed 
fraction of the revenue from selling product B as a fee. 
Supplier B can also produce B and sell it in other markets, however, we do not consider it 
here. In this agreement, supplier B does not concern about the order size due to defining 
order size by supplier A and all the risk of shortage or lost will be occurred by supplier A. 
Although in both facility sharing and franchise contracts, product B is produced by 
supplier A and sold through the retailer, one of the main features that distinguishes these 
two contracts is the risk which is taken by supplier B in facility sharing implementation 
and by supplier A when franchise contract is applied. Also in the franchise contract 
supplier B does not pay for product B at all and she just receives the fraction of revenue 
from the sold units of B as a fee for the brand, while under facility sharing contract, 
supplier B pays for product B that is produced by supplier A. 
 
 
            
 
It is notable that the franchise contract is implemented due to unlimited capacity of the 
suppliers. We consider a new parameter t  that indicates the fee which is paid by supplier 
A to supplier B and in our model, t  is considered between 0 and 1. Supplier B receives 




















To model the transaction between two parties, the following extra notations are used: 
: Fee given to supplier B per each unit
: Profit of the th supplier after Franchise contract








By using the above notations, the profit function for the supply chain’s members can be 
expressed as follow. 
Supplier A’s profit function 
Due to the deterministic demand, the order quantity and the demand are the same; we do 
not consider the batch size and just the demand is mentioned in the model. Thus there is 
no shortage or overage for any of the products and the order size is exactly equal the 
foreseen demand in our case.  
( , )FCA A BF P P = own profit (from product A) – manufacturing product B + fraction of the 
revenue from selling product with the brand B 
( , ) ( )( )
( (1 ) )( )
FC
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F P P P P P C
C t P P P
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    
                                                         (41)                        
Supplier B’s profit function 
The profit function for the supplier B is defined basically as the brand name fee. As it is 
mentioned earlier, supplier B is producing B but sells in other possible markets and we do 





( , ) ( )FCB A B B B B B B AF P P tP P P                                                                                (42) 
Optimal Selling prices 
Since supplier A’s profit function is concave, we can obtain the optimal selling prices by 
considering the derived profit function with respect to 
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Selling prices for each supplier can be calculated as follow when all the parameters are 
known for both parties: 
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And the same expression for supplier B: 
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Condition: 
1. According to the first and second derivatives with respect to ,A BP P  and t , the 
function is concave only when the following condition is satisfied: 
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2. Supplier A will accept the contract with supplier B only if he receives better 
profit at the end of the season. Thus the following condition should be held:  
            B BtP C                                                                                                           (47) 
Thus if all the parameters are known, the selling prices that optimize the profit function 
can be achieved. If we plot the optimum selling price in the profit function, the optimum 
profit function with respect to the demand for each supplier is obtained. 
Table 2 summarizes profit functions and optimal selling prices for the wholesale price, 
facility sharing and franchise contract.  In order to demonstrate the efficiency of any of 
these three contracts in our particular case, we need to establish an experimental analysis 
to compare the profit obtained for each of the supply chain members under similar 
circumstances. Notice that all of the models provided for our specific scenario are under 
linear demand and the demand is considered as a deterministic factor. The following 
chapter contributes a numerical example based on the primary assumptions and the 
sensitivity analysis has been done to indicate the impact of the main parameters on the 
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4. Experimental Results and Analysis 
In this chapter, we aim for investigating the effectiveness of implementing two presented 
contracts (facility sharing and franchise) on the supply chain under investigation. Each 
contract is applied on the supply chain and the profit of each supplier is compared with 
the profit under wholesale price contract. Also, we are looking for the impact of demand 
function parameters on each supplier’s profit under different contracts. It is critical to 
emphasise that, the comparison is done by considering the profit under each contract 
provided in chapter 3. 
As we explained in chapter 3, we basically consider two different scenarios: 
1) Competing suppliers selling through a common retailer (CSAR)  
2) Partnership of supplier A and the retailer (CR&S) 
The main goal is to analyze the profit of each supplier under the above scenarios. The 
first scenario is the classical model which consists of coordination among two 
competitive suppliers and a common retailer when whole sale price contract exists 
between the suppliers and the retailer.  
The second scenario consists of a partnership between the dominant supplier and the 
retailer. In this part, we implement facility sharing and franchise contract.  Each contract 
deals with some specific parameters and in order to show the effect of each parameter, we 





The first set of results are concerned with comparing the profit of each supplier under 
scenarios CSAR and CR&S in order to show the efficiency of partnership on the supply 
chain performance. Then, we mainly focus on CR&S and two contracts are implemented. 
All the formulations have been coded in excel and also the results have been checked in 
C++. 
1.6 Numerical example data and assumptions 
In this section, we provide details on the numerical example that has been implemented. 
The numerical example that we considered is based on the following primary 
assumptions: 
1) Primary market share of product A is greater than product B ( A B   ). 
2) Own price sensitivity parameter is always greater than the competitor’s price 
sensitivity parameter (    ). 
3) The production cost for supplier B is greater than supplier A ( B AC C ). 
4) The whole sale price of supplier B is greater than supplier A ( B AW W ). 
5) The whole sale price is always greater than production cost ( W C  ).  








Table 3 Parameters used in numerical example 
Variables Supplier A Supplier B 
primary market share (α) 60 units 50 units 
Own price sensitivity (𝜷) 0.9 0.9 
Competitor’s price sensitivity ( 𝜰) 0.02 0.02 
Production cost 8 $ 15 $ 
Wholesale price 10 $ 15.5 $ 
 
1.7 Analyzing CSAR and CR&S scenarios 
To get better insight into the effect of competition parameter ( ) and own price 
sensitivity (  ) on the profit of each supplier, in each part we fix one of the two 
parameters and change the other one. The findings based on several experiments are 
summarized in table 4. Graphical representation of these results is presented in Appendix 
A1.1. 
Table 4 Choice of no-partnership vs. partnership system at different competition levels 
competition (𝜰) Low competition  High competition  
Supplier A (product A) partnership with retailer partnership with retailer 
Supplier B (product B) No significant difference 
Better off when supplier 






Table 4 demonstrates each supplier’s better off under the two different scenarios which 
are CSAR and CR&S; supplier A is better off under CR&S (partnership) whether there is 
high competition between the suppliers or low competition. While this alliance leads to 
worse off for supplier B when the competition is high and under low competition 
scenario, there is not a significant difference in supplier B’s profit under the two schemes.  
The result provided in table 4 confirms that close association of supplier A with retailer is 
always beneficial for this supplier as also pointed out by Daugherty et al. (2006) and 
Bowersox et al. (2003). 
Giving the previous circumstances (CSAR and CR&S), by considering different levels of 
own price sensitivity parameters, likewise the previous results, we conclude that with the 
partnership, supplier A see improvements in its profit at the cost of supplier B’s profit 
(Appendix A1.1). Our numerical experiment indicates that it is difficult for supplier B to 
compete with supplier A when the latter forms an alliance with the retailer.  In this 
situation, Supplier B will be willing to form an alliance with the competing supplier A. 
Since both suppliers are in competition, such relationship will be governed by some kind 
of contracts such as these investigated in this thesis.  
We choose the following abbreviation to indicate the implemented coordinating contract: 
WP (Wholesale price), FS (Facility sharing), and FC (Franchise contract). 
Table 5 indicates the parameters of facility sharing and franchise contracts that have been 





Table 5 Facility sharing and Franchise contract parameters 
Variable Supplier B 
Facility sharing parameter   0.6 
Facility sharing parameter FSS  8.01$ 
Franchise parameter t  0.2 
 
1.8 Analysis of partnership using facility sharing and wholesale price 
contract 
In this section we analyze the supply chain coordination using facility sharing and whole 
sale price contracts. We compare the effectiveness of the contract by comparing the profit 
of each supplier after implementing them.  
Recall from chapter 3, in this contract supplier A accepts to produce product B and   
represents the fraction of the revenue that supplier A keeps and (1- ) will be given to 
supplier B. 
In order to assess the effect of   and  , similar to the previous section, we consider one 
parameter is changing and the other is fixed. So we can demonstrate the consequence of 
implementing facility sharing in various cases compared to the system with the wholesale 
price contract.  
In order to limit the experiments, we just consider two different ranges for   and 
according to the result; we believe that these ranges can provide a good insight. We study 




Case 1)  >0.5: This case implies that, a significant portion of the revenue (more than 
50% ) from product B will be shared with Supplier A. 
Case 2)  <0.5: This case implies that a small portion of the revenue (say less than 50%) 
from product B is shared with Supplier A. 
 Comparative study with respect to competitor’s price sensitivity 1.8.1
In this part we consider the effect of competitor’s price sensitivity on the profit of the 
suppliers. The graphs are shown in the Appendix (A2.1) and the results are summarised 
in table 6. In the above numerical example we fixed A B  = 0.9. 
Case 1)  >0.5 
Based on several experiments, when there is low competition, supplier A is better off 
under FS contract. The reason is that he is given more than half of the revenue from 
selling product B and because of low competition; the competitor’s price is not affecting 
the other product’s demand significantly. Supplier B is better off under facility sharing 
contract too, because the implementation of this contract leads to reduction of production 
cost and selling price of product B. Although more than half of the revenue of selling 
product B will be given to supplier A, still there is an incentive for supplier B due to 
reduction of the production cost and selling price.  
When the competitor’s price sensitivity is high (High competition), supplier A is better 
off under facility sharing again because of the big share of revenue from selling product 
B. Likewise supplier B is better off under FS(Appendix A2.1). 




If less than half of the revenue from sharing product B is given to supplier A, the graphs 
show different result. When the competition is low, supplier A earns better profit by not 
implementing facility sharing contract, because he is given less than 50% of the revenue 
under FS and producing product A and B is not as profitable for him under this contract. 
On the other hand, because supplier B receives more than half of the revenue, she is 
better off under FS contract. 
Under high competition, again it is more profitable for supplier A to perform under the 
wholesale price contract. For the second supplier the result is the same as before and 
facility sharing is more efficient for her (Appendix A2.1). 
 Comparative study with respect to own price sensitivity   1.8.2
This part investigates the effect of own price sensitivity (  ) on the performance of FS 
and WP contract.  The graphs are shown in the Appendix A2.2 and the results are 
summarised in table 6. 
Case 1)  >0.5 
When more than half of the revenue from selling product B is given to supplier A and 
own price sensitivity parameter is small, supplier A is better off under WP. Facility 
sharing performs better for supplier A only when more than 90% of the revenue from 
selling product B is given to him. Otherwise wholesale price is more profitable. The 
reason is when the price sensitivity is low, the augmentation in selling price does not 




having good profit under WP and producing product B is only profitable when a very big 
share of the revenue from selling B is given to supplier A. 
In contrary, by considering low own-price sensitivity, Supplier B is considerably better 
off under FS. Even though supplier B receives less than half of revenue from selling 
product B, still the product cost reduction has an effective impact on the revenue. Under 
this assumption from figure (7-8) in Appendix A2.1,  we see a dramatic fall in supplier 
B’s profit under FS (Figure (7-9)) due to the change in selling price of product B. Selling 
price of product B under FS is less than WP contract when competition price sensitivity 
is small. By increasing   ,  selling price of product B under WP is less than WP contract. 
Case 2)  <0.5 
When small fraction of selling product B is given to supplier A, after several 
experiments, we conclude that it is not beneficial for supplier A to implement FS contract 
and he is better off under WP contract whether   is small or high. In both situations, 
because of the small fraction, whole sale price is more beneficial for supplier A. 
Conversely, supplier B is better off under FS by considering low and high owns price 









 Conclusion  1.8.3















Price sensitivity  
High price 
sensitivity 
A B    
Low price sensitivity 
A B   

















High competition FS FS FS FS 
Low competition FS FS FS FS 
 
Table 6 reflects each supplier’s better off under the assumption of implementing facility 
sharing contract or not implementing this contract. Furthermore, it is worth mentioning 
that the obtained result can be totally changed under nonlinear demand function and also 
by changing any of the assumptions mentioned earlier.  
As it can be observed in table 6, supplier B cannot compete with the local supplier when 
product B is expensive. Hence the only way to compete with supplier A is implementing 
a profitable facility sharing contract. According to several experiments, the profit of 




cost of B is decreased. This leads to reduction in the selling price and consequently 
improvement in the demand and profit for supplier B.  
Oppositely, it is not always profitable for supplier A to implement FS. Specifically when 
small percentage of the revenue from selling product B is given to supplier A. Supplier A 
has a big market share and he will agree on FS only if it leads to more profit for him. 
When less than half of the revenue from selling product B is given to supplier A, he is 
better off under WP because FS leads to less selling price and more demand for product 
B which is not pleasant for supplier A and less than half of the revenue from selling 
product B cannot cover the expenses.  
To sum up, we can consider 4 mutual scenarios when both suppliers are better off under 
the same contract. Facility sharing leads to better off for supplier A and supplier B when: 
1) The own price sensitivity is high and  >0.5, considering low competition. 
2) The own price sensitivity is high and  >0.5, considering high competition. 
3) The own price sensitivity is low and    0.9, considering low competition. 
4) The own price sensitivity is low and    0.9, considering high competition. 
Next part is related to comparing supplier A and supplier B’s profit under franchise 




1.9 Analysis of partnership using franchise and whole sale price contract 
This part investigates the profit of each supply chain’s member under WP contract and 
franchise contract (FC). By applying the franchise contract, supplier A plays as a 
franchisee and uses the brand of the other supplier (Brand B). 
Supplier A produces product A and also uses the brand of product B. In order to 
moderate the channel, supplier A pays supplier B a fraction of the revenue from selling 
product B as a fee at the end of the season which is defined by t  and it is consider 
between 0 and 1. It is worth pointing out that when the franchise contract is implemented, 
there is the possibility for supplier B to sell its product to other markets, however we only 
consider the transaction as the fee given to supplier B by supplier A and the rest of selling 
to other markets is not considered here. 
Repeatedly we categorize the effect of main parameters and illustrate the impact of 
changing each parameter by fixing the others. It is sensible that implementing franchise 
contract would be an incentive for supplier B since she is seeking to maximize its profit.  
The most important parameter that impacts the profit under the franchise contract is t . 
According to the results, by increasing t  supplier B is more interested in implementing 
franchise contract because the augmentation of t  leads to more revenue for her; on the 
other hand, supplier A is seeking to set the least possible value for the fee ( )t . 
 In order to obtain better insight, we consider two different situations for the fee on the 




Case 1) t  < 0.5: it implies that less than 50% of selling product B will be given to 
Supplier B and the rest is kept by supplier A.  
Case 2) t  > 0.5: it implies that more than 50% of selling product B will be given to 
Supplier B and the rest is kept by supplier A. 
 Comparative study with respect to product differentiation (competitor’s 1.9.1
price sensitivity)  
In this part we consider the effect of competitor’s price sensitivity on the profit of 
suppliers. The graphs are shown in the Appendix A3.1 and the results are summarised in 
the table 7. We fixed A B  = 0.9. 
Case 1) t  < 0.5 
Supplier B is better off under modified franchise since the production cost for her is too 
high to effectively compete with supplier A. According to the results, supplier B is better 
off even when she is given a small percentage of the revenue from selling product B 
under low or high competition. Supplier A is only better off under modified franchise 
contract when t <0.2 and he keeps a significant percentage of the revenue from selling 
product B. Although producing A and B under franchise contract affects the demand of 
production A, when the fee for supplier B is low, franchise is profitable for supplier A. If 
we consider 0.2< t <0.5, Supplier A is better off under wholesale price contract.    
  Case 2) t > 0.5 
Based on multiple experiments we observed that when the fee for supplier B is high, it is 




sensitivity and small share for supplier A. Under high and low competition, supplier A 
would not be better off by applying the modified FC. While supplier B is better off when 
she receives more than half of the revenue from selling product B as fee. From the data in 
the Appendix A3 it is apparent that supplier B is better off under low or high competition 
when the modified franchise is implemented. Modified franchise contract causes the 
reduction in the selling price of product B because under this contract, product B is 
manufactured by supplier A under a lower production cost. On the other hand, the 
demand of product A is decreased under franchise contract. Thus when supplier A pays a 
big fraction of the revenue from selling product B to supplier B as a fee, he is worse off 
under this contract. 
 Comparative study with respect to own price sensitivity   1.9.2
Case 1) t <0.5 
When price sensitivity is low, supplier A is still better off under wholesale price and it is 
not profitable to act as a franchisee for the other brand. And with low or high competition 
supplier A will apply wholesale price. Whereas Supplier B is better off when she sells his 
brand and receives the fee instead of producing product B with high production cost. 
Case 2) t  >0.5   
When the suppliers are not very sensitive to their own selling price, supplier A is worse 
off under modified franchise contract when competition is high or low. Product A has a 
big share of market and due to low production cost, it is not profitable for supplier A to 
apply franchise contract when more than half of the revenue from selling product B is 




contract whether the price sensitivity is high or low as a result of high production cost. 
The graphs are shown in Appendix A3.2. 
 Conclusion  1.9.3
Applying franchise contract is expensive for all members; however we do not consider 
the implementation expenses. According to the graphs FC leads to better profit for the 
supply chain members in some particular scenarios. The results obtained from the 
analysis are summarized in table 7. This result may not be valid under different 
hypothetical or other special cases. 















Price sensitivity  
High price 
sensitivity 
A B    
Low price sensitivity 
A B   





If t <0.2 
then FC  - - 
Low competition 
 - 
If t <0.2 




FC FC FC FC 
Low competition 
FC  FC FC FC 
 
As it can be observed in table 7, the comparison of the result reveals that supplier A 




better off particularly if he keeps a significant share of the revenue from selling product 
B. When supplier A and B are not sensitive to their own price it is not profitable for 
supplier A to act as a franchisee and buy supplier B’s brand even if he receives a big 
share.  
By considering all scenarios we conclude that supplier B is always better off to sell her 
brand rather than producing product B with high production cost. It is profitable for 
supplier B to sell her brand when they are very sensitive to their own price or under low 
sensitivity. 
1.10 Comparing WP, FS and FC 
 Equal characteristics (  and A B A B      ) 1.10.1
In this section, we compare the results of implementing each of the contracts under 
different scenarios and the conclusion provides a framework to choose the best contract 
under different circumstances. In order to establish a framework that compares the 
efficiency of wholesale price, facility sharing and franchise contract we consider the 
mutual areas for both suppliers. Then we can illustrate the best of these three presented 
contract that can be applied on our case based on the primary assumptions that we 
consider. 
Following graphs are provided to indicate the impact of each variable on profit of 
supplier A and supplier B under three different contracts. The profit is based on the 
optimal selling price for each product. 




Scenario 1) A Big Share of selling product B is given to Supplier A (High own price 
sensitivity) 
Let’s assume that under facility sharing contract more than half of the revenue from 
selling product B is given to supplier A ( 0.5   ). Also, under the franchise contract 
more than half of the revenue from selling product B is kept by supplier A and the rest is 
given to supplier B as the fee ( 0.5t   ).Figure (4-1) indicates the effect of increasing 
competition on supplier A’s profit under the three contracts. In this graph we consider
0.9A B   . It can be seen that when supplier A is very sensitive to his own price 
(increase in selling price highly affects the demand), and more than half of the revenue 
from selling product B is kept by him, facility sharing contract results in better profit 
compared to franchise contract and whole sale price contract (Appendix A4.1.1). 
 























When the competition rate is low, supplier A is better off under FS, however there is not 
a significant difference between three contracts. While by increasing the competition rate, 
the difference between the contracts is significant. Franchise leads to the least profit 
because it is not profitable for supplier A to buy product B’s brand while the price 
sensitivity is high. 
 
 
Figure ‎0-2 The effect of competition parameter on supplier B’s profit 
Supplier B is better off under franchise contract and she has the lowest profit under 
wholesale price contract since production cost is high. By increasing the competition, the 
difference of the profit under franchise and facility sharing is reduced. Figure (4-2) shows 
that supplier B has better profit when she accepts supplier A as her franchisee since she 
does not face high production expenses. Facility sharing is also profitable for supplier B 



























Figure ‎0-3 Supplier A and B's fractional profit under low competition 
Figure (4-3) demonstrates the fractional profit for each supplier under three different 
contracts. It demonstrates the profit under three different values for own price sensitivity 
when the competition is low. The profit for each supplier is given by 




Profit of supplier B
Total profit
 under three contracts. 
According to figure (4-3), supplier A is better off under whole sale price because the 
competition is low and he can sell with a reasonable selling price. Supplier A’s profit 
under facility sharing is as good as wholesale price only when the price sensitivity is 
high. Franchise causes worse off for supplier A. Supplier B is better off under franchise 
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Figure (4-4) reports the profit for each supplier by considering high own price sensitivity 
under three levels of competition. The graph presents the effectiveness of facility sharing 
on supplier A’s profit. Supplier B is better off when she sells her brand under franchise 
contract. In this graph supplier B’s profit under WP and FS is not shown properly due to 
very small profit values. It can be seen that both suppliers are better off by increasing 
competition and facility sharing is profitable for supplier B when competition is high. 
 
Figure ‎0-4 Supplier A and Supplier B's profit under high own price sensitivity 
Figure (4-5) demonstrates the retail prices of each product under high price sensitivity 
and low competition. As we mentioned before, the goal of suggesting a coordinating 
contract is reduction in the production cost and the selling price. Therefore, in the results 
we can see a small difference is product A’s retail price, while there is a significant 
change in product B’s retail price under different contracts. The retail price of product B 
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Figure ‎0-5 Retail price of product A and B under high price sensitivity and low competition 
 
In order to present better implication, we consider the effectiveness of facility sharing and 
franchise contract with respect to whole sale price in table (8) when we set high own 
price sensitivity 1 2( 0.9)   . The effectiveness is defined by the profit of the supply 
chain member over the profit under whole sale price: 





































Table 8  The effect of changing competitor's price sensitivity on profit effectiveness 














































































From table 8, it is obvious that when   is very small (0.001), meaning that the sensitivity 
to the competitor’s selling price is low and the demand is not significantly affected by the 
other supplier’s selling price, FS causes better off for supplier A and worse off for 
supplier B. While supplier B is much better off under FC. By increasing competition FC 
leads to less profit for supplier A and oppositely supplier B is better off under FC. 
When competition is very high (   =0.7), FS and FC work very good for supplier B. On 
the other hand, these two contracts make less profit for supplier A comparing to the 




Scenario 1) A Big Share of selling product B is given to Supplier A (Low own price 
sensitivity) 
 
Figure ‎0-6 Supplier A and Supplier B's profit under low own price sensitivity 
According to figure above, although a big share of revenue from selling product B 
belongs to supplier A ( 0.5  and 0.5t   ), because of low own price sensitivity supplier 
A is better off under WP compared to FC and FS (Appendix A4.1.2). Thus under this 
specific assumptions, FC and FS are profitable for supplier A, while they are profitable 
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Scenario 2) A Big Share of selling product B belongs to Supplier B (High own price 
sensitivity) 
We assume that under FS, less than half of the revenue from selling product B is given to 
supplier A ( 0.5   ). Also, under FC contract, less than half of the revenue from selling 
product B is kept by supplier A and the rest is given to supplier B as the fee ( 0.5t   ). 
Based on several experiments summarized in Appendix A4.2.1 and figure (4-7), when a 
small percentage of the revenue from selling product B is given to supplier A, he is worse 
off under facility sharing and franchise contract.  
 
Figure ‎0-7 Supplier A and supplier B's profit under high own price sensitivity 
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As it can be seen in figure (4-8), when supplier A is payed less than half of the revenue 
from selling product B, it is not profitable for him to implement facility sharing or 
franchise contract because these contracts lead to more demand and profit for supplier B 
(Appendix A4.2.2).  
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 Different characteristics (  and A B A B     ) 1.10.2
Up to this section, we particularly focused on a supply chain with equal characteristics 
for the suppliers. But in this part we study different characteristic for each supplier in 
table 9. We assume that 0.5   and 0.5t  .   
Table 9 The effect of different characteristics on supplier A and B's profit 
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As it can be seen from table 9, in terms of comparing the profit of each supplier under the 
scenarios of partnership and no partnership, the results for the profit of the suppliers are 
the same as the profit under equal characteristics.    
While in table 9, case 1 and 2 are the cases that the results are quietly different. We 
explain about each different case: 
1. When A B  , it means that supplier A is more sensitive to his own price 
compared to supplier B. Under equal  , supplier A is better off under facility 




under wholesale price is more than the profit under FS and FC. Thus when 
supplier A is very sensitive to his own price, FS and FC are not profitable for him 
and wholesale price leads to better off. Also when we consider equal   for the 
suppliers, supplier B is better off under franchise contract, while under the 
assumption of A B  , facility sharing is more profitable than franchise contract. 
Thus supplier A will not implement FS or FC when he is more sensitive to his 
own price.  
2. When A B  , we see different results for supplier A’s profit when   is small. 
When supplier A’s competitor’s price sensitivity  parameter is smaller than 
supplier B’s competitor’s price sensitivity, franchise contract leads to better off 
for supplier A comparing to WP, while under the assumption of equal 
characteristic WP is better than FS and FC.  We conclude that when supplier A is 
not very sensitive to his own price and his competitor’s price, franchise contract 
can be implemented on the supply chain. When we assume high price sensitivity 
for the suppliers, the results are the same.   









5. Conclusion and Future Research 
1.11  Conclusion 
In this study we discussed a supply chain consists of two competitive suppliers and a 
common retailer. The dominant supplier is the local one and he can produce the product 
under low production cost. While the other supplier is the foreigner who faces the low 
demand due to high production cost and transportation cost. We aimed to determine if 
there is a coordinating contract that can be applied on this supply chain.  
First we analyze the classical model under linear deterministic demand functions and   
considered the wholesale price contract. Then we assumed a case where the dominant 
supplier and the retailer became close partners and analyzed the relationship. 
Subsequently, we analyzed the relationships under popular supply chain contracts. We 
suggested a modified facility sharing contract which was inspired by the revenue sharing 
contract. The profit function and optimal selling prices for each supplier has presented. 
Then we used the concept of franchise contract and another contract was discussed.  
Whole sale price was used in order to analyse the effectiveness of the suggested 
contracts.  
Finally a numerical example is used to show each contract’s effect on the mentioned 
supply chain. By changing the main parameters, we showed the scenarios that each 
contract is profitable for the suppliers. The aim of this thesis was to assess the 





Based on multiple experiments we generally confirmed that partnership of the retailer and 
local supplier makes better profit for the members compared to the decentralized system. 
While the outsider supplier is worse off when the retailer and local supplier become close 
partners. This result has been proved in several papers. 
The study shows that between wholesale contract, facility sharing contract and franchise 
contract, wholesale price causes the least profit for the foreign supplier since her 
production cost is too high so she seeks to reduce this production cost. 
The investigation of different levels of competition and own price sensitivity showed that 
supplier B is better off under franchise contract in most of the scenarios. We can 
conclude that in our hypothetical case, the outsider supplier cannot reduce her production 
cost unless she agrees on coordination with the local supplier. In this thesis, the 
coordination can be achieved by implementing facility sharing contract or franchise 
contract. 
Supplier A is mainly better off under wholesale price contract. But there are some 
specific scenarios that facility sharing works better for supplier A: 
1) When the price sensitivity is high and more than half of the revenue from selling 
product B is given to supplier A and the competition between two brands is low.   
2) When the price sensitivity is high more than half of the revenue from selling 
product B is given to supplier A and the competition between two brands is high. 
3) When the price sensitivity is low and almost the total revenue from selling 




4) When the price sensitivity is low and almost the total revenue from selling 
product B is given to supplier A, considering high competition. 
5) Under the assumption of different characteristics, when supplier A is more 
sensitive to his own price comparing to the other supplier ( A B  ), even if he is 
offered a big share of revenue from selling product B, he is better off under whole 
sale price rather than FS and FC. 
6) Under the assumption of different characteristics, when A B   and price 
sensitivity is low, franchise is profitable for supplier A and supplier B. 
Based on the results, although franchise contract leads to better pay off for supplier B, it 












1.12 Future research 
In this work we were limited to deterministic linear demand. It will be interesting to see 
in future scope of such collaborations under linear and multiplicative stochastic demand. 
In addition, we did not consider different channel powers in this study, a greater focus on 
channel structures could produce interesting findings regarding the presented supply 
chain. 
We study two popular coordinating contracts. Another possible area of future research 
might be modifying other contracts such as two-part tariff, quantity discount, etc. 
We considered a linear demand function. This study can be repeated by applying a 
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A1: Partnership vs. No Partnership 
A1.1 Scenario 1: No Partnership (CSAR) 
1)  Effect of    on supplier A and supplier B’s profit 
 
Figure ‎0-1 The effect of competition parameter on the profit of each supplier 
From the graph above we can see that the profit has been increased by augmentation of 


























2) Effect of 𝜷 on supplier A and supplier B’s profit 
 
Figure ‎0-2 The effect of 𝜷 on supplier A and supplier B’s profit 
According to the graphs related to changing   , increasing price sensitivity in this system 
leads to less selling price for both competitors and also less profit for all the parties. 
A1.2 Scenario 2:  Partnership of Supplier A and Retailer (CR&S) 




























Figure ‎0-3 The effect of 𝜰 on Supplier A’s profit before and after partnership 
 
Figure ‎0-4 The effect of 𝜰 on Supplier B’s profit before and after partnership 
It is obvious that there is a sharp fall in supplier B’s profit after partnership of Supplier A 
and retailer and the difference is increasing by increasing the product substitutability. 
Hence she prefers to stay in decentralized system in a scenario where there is high 
competition among the suppliers. As the product A and B are more differentiated, the 
profit difference is decreasing. The results of the correlational analysis that are presented 
in two figures above represent that by increasing the competition (i.e., less differentiated 








































A2: FS VS. WP 
A2.1 Effect of 𝜰on supplier A and supplier B’s profit 
Scenario 1: When Supplier A gains more than 50% of the profit from selling product B  
 >0.5 
 

























Figure ‎0-6 The effect of increasing 𝜰 on Supplier B’s profit under WP and FS 
Scenario 2: When Supplier A gains less than 50% of the profit from selling product B  
 <0.5  
 







































Figure ‎0-8 The effect of increasing 𝜰 on Supplier B’s profit under WP and FS 
 
 
Figure ‎0-9 The effect of increasing 𝜰 on product B’s selling price under WP and FS 




































Product B's selling price 
selling price of B
(WP)




Scenario 1: When Supplier A gains more than 50% of the profit from selling product B 
 >0.5 
 
Figure ‎0-10 The effect of price sensitivity on Supplier A’s profit under WP and FS 
 
 










































Scenario 2: When Supplier A gains less than 50% of the profit from selling product B  
 <0.5  
 
Figure ‎0-12 The effect of price sensitivity on Supplier A’s profit under WP and FS 
 
 












































A3: FC VS. WP 
A3.1 Effect of 𝜰 on supplier A and supplier B’s profit 
Scenario 1: When Supplier A gains more than 50% of the profit from selling product B: 
 t  <0.5 
 
Figure ‎0-14 The effect of increasing competitor’s price sensitivity on Supplier A’s profit under 
WP and FC 
 
Scenario 2: When Supplier A gains less than 50% of the profit from selling product B  






















Figure ‎0-15 The effect of increasing 𝜰 on supplier B’s profit under WP and FC 
 








































Figure ‎0-17 The effect of increasing 𝜰 on supplier B’s profit under WP and FC 
 
 
Figure ‎0-18 The effect of increasing 𝜰 on product B’s selling price before and after FC 
 
A3.2 Effect of 𝜷on supplier A and supplier B’s profit 
Scenario 1: When Supplier A gains more than 50% of the profit from selling product B 













































Figure ‎0-19 The effect of increasing own price sensitivity on Profit of Supplier A under 
WP and FC 
 
 
Figure ‎0-20 The effect of increasing own price sensitivity on Profit of Supplier B under WP and 
FC 
Scenario 2: When Supplier A gains less than 50% of the profit from selling product B  





























































































A4: FS, FC VS. WP 
A4.1 Scenario 1) A big Share of selling product B is given to Supplier A 
A4.1.1 High price sensitivity 
 
Figure ‎0-23 The effect of competitor’s price sensitivity on supplier A's profit 
 
 











































A4.1.2 Low price sensitivity 
 
Figure ‎0-25 The effect of competitor’s price sensitivity on supplier A's profit 
 















































A 4.2 Scenario 2) Small share belongs to supplier A 
A 4.2.1 High price sensitivity 
 
Figure ‎0-27 The effect of competitor’s price sensitivity on supplier A's profit 
 
 














































A 4.2.2 Low price sensitivity 
 
Figure ‎0-29 The effect of competitor’s price sensitivity on supplier A's profit 
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